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The Orwell Court: How the Supreme Court 
Recast History and Minimized the Role of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to Justify 
Limiting the Impact of Johnson v. United 
States 
“Who controls the past controls the future. 
Who controls the present controls the past.” 
– George Orwell, 1984 
BRANDON E. BECK† 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, federal criminal defendants have enjoyed great 
success in challenging “residual clauses” within the United States 
Code as unconstitutional. This began in 2015 when the United 
States Supreme Court, in Johnson v. United States,1 struck a 
portion of the Armed Career Criminal Act2 as void for vagueness.  
Johnson’s holding at first appeared monumental because it 
invalidated a provision commonly used to enhance the prison 
sentences of offenders with certain qualifying prior convictions.  
Subsequent developments, however, significantly dulled the impact 
of Johnson, thwarting the dramatic reduction in sentences it once 
foreshadowed. 
This Article is about how Johnson came to be and the 
mechanisms through which the Supreme Court has subsequently 
weakened Johnson’s effect. It will describe two specific mechanisms: 
 
† Assistant Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of Texas, appellate 
division, and Adjunct Professor at Texas Tech University School of Law. 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 2. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 
2185 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). 
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(1) the Supreme Court’s recasting of the history of federal 
sentencing in an attempt to contextualize the holding of Booker v. 
United States3 as a return to the bygone days of indeterminate 
sentencing; and (2) the Supreme Court’s evolving view of the role of 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) in the federal 
criminal system that minimizes the Guidelines’ actual influence 
over a district court’s sentencing decisions. It will then explain why 
these mechanisms—one that exerts control over the past and one 
that exerts control over the present—are both unfounded. Finally, 
this Article will suggest ways in which those involved in federal 
criminal law—the United States Sentencing Commission 
(Sentencing Commission), Congress, the courts, and the criminal 
bar—can address the problems that the Court’s recent decisions 
have caused in our criminal justice system. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009 and 2012, respectively, Oscar Rash and Laneer 
Everett found themselves in parallel legal circumstances. 
Both were convicted of felonies in the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin: Rash of a federal firearms offense4 and Everett of 
a federal drug trafficking offense.5 Both saw their sentences 
increased under a federal recidivism provision based, in part, 
on their prior state convictions for “vehicular flight”: Rash 
under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act6 
and Everett under an identically worded residual clause in 
the Guidelines.7 Finally, both were sentenced to fifteen years 
 
 3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 4. Rash v. United States, No. 15-C-1485, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320, at 
*1 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 23, 2015). 
 5. Everett v. United States, No. 17-CV-523-JPS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73642, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2017). 
 6. Rash, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320, at *2. The Armed Career Criminal 
Act (ACCA) residual clause defines “violent felony” as a prior felony conviction 
that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2018). 
 7. Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73642, at *2. The U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual’s career-offender residual clause was identical to the ACCA 
residual clause, defining “crime of violence” as a prior felony convict ion that 
“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2011). 
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imprisonment: Rash as an “armed career criminal”8 and 
Everett as a “career offender.”9 
As of 2011, neither Rash nor Everett had a path to 
appellate relief because the United States Supreme Court 
held, in Sykes v. United States, that vehicular flight was a 
qualifying residual clause offense.10 Accordingly, they were 
left with no choice but to serve their time. But in 2015, Rash 
and Everett received a ray of hope. The Supreme Court 
decided Johnson v. United States, which overruled Sykes and 
struck the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause as 
void for vagueness.11 A year later, in Welch v. United States, 
the Court made Johnson retroactive in cases on collateral 
review.12 Both Rash and Everett filed motions, in the district 
court, to vacate their sentences in light of Johnson because, 
without a valid residual clause, their convictions for 
vehicular flight no longer supported an enhanced sentence.13 
Even though the Government conceded that armed 
career criminals and career offenders were both entitled to 
relief under Johnson,14 Rash and Everett experienced 
different results. In the same jurisdiction, the district court 
 
 8. Rash, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320, at *1–2. An armed career criminal 
is a federal firearms offender who has three qualifying prior convictions for either 
a violent felony or a “serious drug offense.” See 18 U.S.C § 924(e)(1). 
 9. Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73642, at *2. A career offender is an 
offender whose instant offense is either a “crime of violence” or “controlled 
substance offense” and who has two qualifying prior conviction for either a crime 
of violence or controlled substance offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 4B1.1. 
 10. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2011). 
 11. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
 12. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016). 
 13. Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence by a Person in Federal 
Custody, 28 U.S.C. 2255 at 6, Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73642 (No. 17-CV-
523-JPS); Unopposed Petition to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at 1–
3, Rash, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320 (No. 15-C-1485). 
 14. See Brief for the United States at 40, Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 
886 (2017) (No. 15-8544) (“In light of those basic purposes of the vagueness 
doctrine, a district court’s use of a vague guideline to calculate an advisory 
Guidelines range violates the Due Process Clause.”). 
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vacated Rash’s sentence while denying Everett relief.15 The 
reason for this disparate treatment was an intervening 
decision from the Supreme Court, United States v. Beckles, 
in which the Court held that the Guidelines are immune 
from constitutional challenges for vagueness.16 Accordingly, 
the same language, extrapolated from the Armed Career 
Criminal Act to the Guidelines,17 led to divergent outcomes 
for armed career criminals and career offenders. As a result, 
Rash is now a free man while Everett continues to languish 
in a federal penitentiary.18 
This Article attempts to look beneath Johnson, Beckles, 
and other decisions to identify the mechanisms through 
which the Supreme Court determined the fates of defendants 
like Rash and Everett. Part II explains how “armed career 
criminals” and “career offenders” received disparate 
treatment, even with the same prior convictions that 
triggered an increased sentence through identically worded 
provisions. Part III explains why this result was wrong both 
from a historical perspective and with a full present 
appreciation of the role of the Guidelines in the federal 
sentencing scheme. Part IV suggests ways in which those 
involved in federal criminal law—the Sentencing 
Commission, Congress, the courts, and the criminal bar—
 
 15. Compare Rash 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320, at *2–3 (granting motion 
and vacating sentence), with Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73642, at *18–19 
(denying motion). 
 16. Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 897 (“Because the advisory Sentencing Guidelines 
are not subject to a due process vagueness challenge, § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause 
is not void for vagueness.”). 
 17. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. I, amend. 268 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (“The definition of crime of violence used in this 
amendment is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”). 
 18. According to the Bureau of Prisons’ online “inmate locator,” Rash was 
released from federal custody on September 9, 2016. Bureau of Prisons Inmate 
Locator, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (use the 
“Find by Name” tab; then input “Oscar” in the first name field and “Rash” in the 
last name field; then select “Search”). Everett is not due for release until 
September 25, 2020. Id. (use the “Find by Name” tab; then input “Laneer” in the 
first name field and “Everett” in the last name field; then select “Search”). 
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can mitigate the harms that unconstitutional and 
constitutionally questionable provisions cause to our 
criminal justice system. 
I. THE MINISTRY OF JUST RESULTS: JOHNSON, WELCH, 
BECKLES, AND THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT RESIDUAL 
CLAUSE 
A. The Armed Career Criminal Act 
On September 11, 1982, President Ronald Reagan gave 
a radio address to the nation on crime and criminal justice 
reform. He began his address with these remarks: 
Today I want to talk with you about a subject that’s been very 
much on my mind, even as we’ve been busy with budgets, interest 
rates, and legislation. It’s a subject I know you’ve been thinking 
about too—crime in our society. 
Many of you have written to me how afraid you are to walk the 
streets alone at night. We must make America safe again, especially 
for women and elderly who face so many moments of fear. You have 
every right to be concerned. We live in the midst of a crime epidemic 
that took the lives of more than 22,000 people last year and has 
touched nearly one-third of American households, costing them 
about $8.8 billion per year in financial losses. 
During the past decade alone, violent crime rose by nearly 60 
percent. Study after study shows that most serious crimes are the 
work of a relatively small group of hardened criminals. Let me give 
you an example—subway crime in New York City. Transit police 
there estimate that only 500 habitual criminal offenders are 
responsible for nearly half the crimes in New York’s subways last 
year. 
It’s time to get these hardened criminals off the street and into 
jail. The primary responsibility for dealing with these career 
criminals must, of course, rest with local and State authorities. But 
I want you to know that this administration, even as it has been 
battling our economic problems, is taking important action on the 
Federal level to fight crime.19 
In the same address, President Reagan proceeded to 
express his intention to eliminate the parole system, limit 
the application of the exclusionary rule, narrow the insanity 
 
 19. Radio Address to the Nation on Crime and Criminal Justice Reform, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1136 (Sept. 11, 1982). 
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defense, increase forfeiture, revise the bail system, and push 
other aggressive law-and-order reforms.20 This address was 
one of many that foreshadowed the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984,21 one of the most significant criminal law 
reforms in this country’s history. An integral component of 
the Crime Control Act was the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA), a three-strikes recidivism law that imposes harsh 
mandatory minimums on repeat violent and drug offenders 
who are caught illegally possessing a firearm.22 The ACCA is 
the starting point for many discussions within federal 
criminal law, and the effect of residual clauses on the federal 
sentencing scheme is no exception. 
1. Background and Purpose 
The ACCA, like other aspects of Reagan-era reform, was 
a product of its time. In the early 1980s, murder was at an 
all-time high.23 There was heightened awareness, discussion, 
and fear of “street violence.”24 The War on Drugs and the War 
on Crime were at full ideological tilt.25 Congress and the 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1837, 1976 (1984). 
 22. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 
2185 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). 
 23. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting statistics, there were 
23,040 intentional or reckless homicides in the United States in 1980, which was 
the highest annual total to date. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTING STATISTICS: ESTIMATED CRIME IN 1980, https://www.bjs.gov 
/ucrdata/Search/Crime/State/OneYearofData.cfm (select “United States-Total” in 
box “a;” then select “Number of violent crimes” in box “b;” then select “1980” in 
box “c;” then select “Get Table”). 
 24. See, e.g., Leonard Buder, 1980 Called Worst Year of Crime in City History, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/25/nyregion/1980-
called-worst-year-of-crime-in-city-history.html. 
 25. As Professor Susan Stuart explains: 
Reagan’s direct references to the War on Drugs in official statements 
and speeches surpassed President Ford’s by a factor of seven. Although 
Reagan couched his War in terms of saving American lives, especially 
children’s lives, his rhetoric nevertheless focused on taking the war to 
the suppliers. Reagan’s allusions to war tactics were often less than 
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American people were willing to tolerate aggressive anti-
crime reforms, even those that exacerbated mass 
incarceration and disproportionately affected minorities.26 
Yet passage of the ACCA was complicated because, at the 
same time, politicians were wary of giving the federal 
government jurisdiction over traditionally local activities, 
even activities such as prosecuting violent criminals.27 
The ACCA was the brainchild of Senator Arlen Specter, 
who first introduced it in 1981 to criminalize the state crimes 
of armed burglary and armed robbery at the federal level.28 
The punishment would be a mandatory minimum sentence 
of fifteen years, up to life in prison, for offenders who had two 
qualifying prior convictions.29 Senator Specter was the 
 
subtle, using terms like “battlefield,” “military intelligence,” “the 
deployment of the armed forces,” “battle,” and “crusade.” Perhaps 
Reagan was no more warrior-like than in his tribute to law enforcement 
officers slain during the War on Drugs . . . . 
Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We 
Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 9 (2011) 
(footnotes omitted). While President Johnson first declared the War on Crime, it 
evolved through President Nixon, President Carter, and finally President Reagan 
to symbolize a more prominent death penalty as well as the abandonment of the 
exclusionary rule and Miranda protections. Jonathan Simon, Gun Rights and the 
Constitutional Significance of Violent Crime, 12 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 335, 
340–51 (2004) (discussing the War on Crime). 
 26. See generally Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus 
Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 381, 381–82 (2002). 
 27. For a great description of the federalism concerns about granting co-
jurisdiction over violent crime to the federal government, see Daniel Richman, 
The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 
393 (2006). 
 28. Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981, S. 1688, 97th Cong. (1981); 
Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1688, S. 1689, and S. 
1690 Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
97th Cong. 3–4 (1981). For a discussion of the ACCA’s early legislative history, 
see United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 679 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
 29. Senator Spector’s bill originally punished “armed career criminals” with 
a mandatory sentence of life in prison. But in light of data demonstrating that 
recidivism rates decrease after an offender turns thirty, Senator Specter revised 
his bill, lowering the mandatory minimum to fifteen years imprisonment. James 
G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing 
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former elected District Attorney of Philadelphia and had 
come to believe that the federal government should play a 
larger role in the prosecution of traditionally state crimes.30 
Many disagreed, including President Reagan, who pocket-
vetoed the bill in 1983.31 Senator Specter, along with then-
Congressman Ron Wyden, reintroduced the bill, which 
Congressman William Hughes then amended to allay 
federalism concerns by limiting the triggering instant 
offense to a pre-existing federal gun crime.32 Meanwhile, the 
threshold number of qualifying prior convictions was 
increased from two to three.33 
The original purpose of the ACCA was not to 
dramatically increase federal prosecutions of repeat 
offenders but to create the possibility of a harsh federal 
sentence in order to pressure offenders to promptly plead 
guilty to state charges, known as the principle of 
“leveraging.”34 With the ACCA in place, the theory went, less 
than one-percent of eligible offenders would actually need to 
be prosecuted to send the appropriate signal to the rest of the 
criminal element. The ACCA’s champion, Senator Specter, 
explained it before Congress as follows: 
If the career criminal bill were in place, it would be possible for a 
district attorney, like the district attorney of Philadelphia, to refer 
a few cases—3, 4, or 5, out of 500—where there would be the 
individual judge’s calendar, a trial within 90 days, strong cases,  
 
Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 545–46 
(2009). 
 30. For a description of Senator Specter’s views, see Arlen Specter & Paul R. 
Michel, The Need for a New Federalism in Criminal Justice, 462 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 59, 59–71 (1982). 
 31. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 680. (“S.1688 was passed by both Houses of 
Congress as part of a larger package, but President Reagan pocket-vetoed it. The 
President’s objection to this aspect of the package concerned the relationship 
between federal and local prosecutors.”). 
 32. Levine, supra note 29, at 546–47. 
 33. See id. at 547. 
 34. For a more developed discussion of “leveraging” and the ACCA, see James  
E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1959–61 (1991). 
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virtually certain convictions, and minimum mandatory sentences of 
15 years to life. 
I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, that if that happened to a few of 
Philadelphia’s career criminals, there would be a mass rush for 
guilty pleas in the State courts, and that it is not optimistic to 
predict that 300 or 400 of the balance of those 500 cases would result 
in guilty pleas, and not with sentences of 15 years to life but with 
sentences of 10 years, or 12 years, much more than is being obtained 
at the present time. It is that leveraging which we really seek to 
accomplish through the career criminal bill.35 
Whether Senator Spector’s stated intent of leveraging 
was sincere or merely to assuage President Reagan’s (and 
others’) federalism concerns, it worked: President Reagan 
signed the ACCA into law, as part of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act, on October 12, 1984.36 
2. Text and Application 
In its present form,37 the ACCA imposes a mandatory 
minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment on 
offenders who commit a federal gun crime and have three or 
more prior convictions that qualify as a “violent felony” or 
“serious drug offense”: 
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and 
has three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony 
or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different 
from one another, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not less than 
 
 35. Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 13 (1984) 
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). 
 36. See Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 
2185 (1984). 
 37. The last major revision to the ACCA was the requirement that the prior 
convictions must have been “committed on occasions different from one another.” 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 
(1988). This clarifying language was Congress’s reaction to the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157, 1159–60 (8th Cir. 1986), which 
affirmed the ACCA enhancement for a man who had been previously convicted, 
under a single indictment, of six counts of robbery, which were committed against 
six different people at a restaurant simultaneously. See Hooper, supra note 34, 
at 1965–66. 
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fifteen years[.]38 
The ACCA, in turn, defines violent felony as follows: 
[T]he term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that— 
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against the person of another; or 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.39 
Textually, the ACCA’s definition of violent felony 
comprises two subsections; courts, however, have analyzed it 
as three separate clauses: the elements clause; the 





has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the 
person of another; or 
Enumerated 
offenses  
is burglary, arson, or extortion, 




otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another. 
A prior conviction need only satisfy one clause to qualify 
as a violent felony.40 And while each clause harbors its own 
set of legal considerations, the most nettlesome portion of the 
definition, and the focus of this discussion, has been the 
ACCA residual clause. 
 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2018). 
 39. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 40. See United States v. Schmidt, 623 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The 
ACCA has three disjunctive prongs, under any one of which an offense may be 
deemed a crime of violence.”). 
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B. How the ACCA Residual Clause Met Its Fate 
Since its enactment, the fourteen-word ACCA residual 
clause has been a bête noire of both defendants and the 
judiciary. From 2007 to 2015, the United States Supreme 
Court heard six arguments on its application, expressing an 
increasing degree of frustration with each decision. As 
Justice Scalia sarcastically remarked in 2011, “[w]e try to 
include an ACCA residual-clause case in about every second 
or third volume of the United States Reports.”41 
1. Ex-Ante Johnson 
The Court’s decisions during this period were ad hoc and 
scattershot. In 2007, the Court held in James that Florida’s 
attempted burglary statute satisfied the ACCA residual 
clause.42 In 2008, the Court held in Begay that New Mexico’s 
felony “DUI statute” did not satisfy the ACCA residual 
clause.43 In 2009, the Court held in Chambers that Illinois’s 
“failure to report for imprisonment” statute did not satisfy 
the ACCA residual clause.44 In 2011, the Court held in Sykes 
that Indiana’s vehicular flight statute satisfied the ACCA 
residual clause.45 Finally, in 2015, after hearing argument 
twice in Johnson v. United States, the Court threw up its 
hands and held that the ACCA residual clause is void for 
vagueness.46 In doing so, however, the Court was careful to 
preserve the remaining portions of the ACCA definition of 
violent felony.47 But the impact of Johnson’s holding cannot 
be overstated: the Court definitively excised one of the most 
 
 41. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 28 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 42. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007). 
 43. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008). 
 44. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 125, 130 (2009). 
 45. Sykes, 564 U.S. at 27–28. 
 46. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015). 
 47. Id. at 2563. (“Today’s decision does not call into question application of 
the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition 
of a violent felony.”). 
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commonly applied prior-conviction-enhancement provisions 
and laid the groundwork for challenging the constitutionality 
of other remaining residual clauses, both in the United 
States Code and the Guidelines. Johnson’s reasoning is, 
however, more subtle and complex than its holding suggests, 
and requires close examination to evaluate its application 
across the federal criminal landscape. 
2. Johnson v. United States 
It would be a mistake to ascribe Johnson’s holding—that 
the ACCA’s residual clause is void for vagueness—to 
Congress’s poor choice of words that presented uncertainties 
in application.48 To be certain, courts apply vague—in the 
non-technical sense—provisions all the time: our own 
Constitution, for example, is full of them.49 Moreover, courts 
impose a strong presumption against facial 
unconstitutionality when construing statutes.50 In truth, the 
holding of Johnson would not have been reached had it not 
been for the analytical framework, known as the “categorical 
approach,” through which courts interpret the ACCA and 
other similar statutes. In this regard, the real story of 
Johnson begins twenty-five years earlier with Taylor v. 
United States, a case in which the Supreme Court was 
struggling to interpret not the ACCA residual clause but its 
enumerated offense of “burglary.”51 
 
 48. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 897 (2017) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[That something is] vague in a general sense—that is to say, 
imprecise or unclear . . . does not necessarily mean that it is vague within the 
well-established legal meaning of that term.”). 
 49. Reasonable minds differ, for example, on the precise breadth of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Compare Glossip 
v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746–50 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring), with id. at 2755–
77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 50. See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) 
(“This Court does and should accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to 
Acts of Congress.”). 
 51. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
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a. Taylor’s Categorical Approach 
When Arthur Lejuane Taylor pleaded guilty to being a 
convicted felon in possession of a firearm in January of 1988, 
he had four prior convictions, all under Missouri law: (1) 
robbery; (2) assault; and (3–4) two convictions for second-
degree burglary.52 When prosecutors sought to enhance 
Taylor’s sentencing exposure to a fifteen year mandatory 
minimum under the ACCA, Taylor conceded that his robbery 
and assault convictions qualified as violent felonies under 
the ACCA residual clause but disputed whether his two 
burglary convictions qualified under any clause.53 The 
district court overruled Taylor’s objections and sentenced 
him to fifteen years imprisonment.54 The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, joining two other circuits in holding that burglary 
in the ACCA enumerated offenses meant burglary “however 
a state chooses to define it.”55 Others circuits, however, were 
taking a different approach: some treated burglary as 
common law burglary,56 while others continued to apply the 
ACCA’s absent definition of burglary57 that Congress 
inexplicably removed in 1986.58 
The Court ultimately settled on a meaning for burglary 
closest to the ACCA’s 1984 definition, which the Court called 
“generic” burglary, meaning burglary in its contemporary 
 
 52. Id. at 578. 
 53. Id. at 579. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 579–80, 580 n.2. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 864 F.2d 625, 627 
(8th Cir. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v. Leonard, 868 F.2d 
1393, 1399 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Portwood, 857 F.2d 1221, 1223–24 
(8th Cir. 1988). 
 56. E.g., United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 757–58 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 57. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1023 (6th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Dombrowski, 877 F.2d 520, 530 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Palmer, 
871 F.2d 1202, 1205–09 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Hill, 863 F.2d 1575, 
1581–83 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 58. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 582 (“The legislative history is silent as to Congress’ 
reason for deleting the definition of burglary.”). 
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sense.59 For absolute clarity, the Court expressly defined 
generic burglary as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, 
or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to 
commit a crime.”60 This formulation, henceforth, is what the 
ACCA and other prior-conviction-enhancement provisions 
mean by burglary.61 Now that the Court had solved the 
problem of defining burglary, it faced a new quandary: how 
to evaluate whether a prior conviction meets or satisfies that 
definition. The Court addressed this problem by creating the 
formal categorical approach.62 
The formal categorical approach, in its most 
straightforward application, holds that if the elements of a 
statute of prior conviction are the same as the elements of 
the generic offense—in Taylor, generic burglary—then the 
prior conviction counts toward the enhancement.63 In more 
concrete terms, if a defendant is charged with a firearms 
offense and has a prior conviction for burglary, the court 
must examine the elements of the particular burglary 
statute for which the defendant was previously convicted, at 
the time of his conviction.64 If that statute has, as its basic 
elements, “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or 
remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to 
commit a crime,” then the prior conviction matches generic 
burglary and would therefore qualify as a violent felony 
toward the ACCA enhancement. If two more prior 
convictions qualify as either a violent felony or serious drug 
offense, then the defendant would be enhanced under the 
 
 59. Id. at 598 (“Congress meant by ‘burglary’ the generic sense in which the 
term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. The Supreme Court most recently applied the Taylor definition of generic 
burglary in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). 
 62. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599–602. 
 63. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013). 
 64. McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 820 (2011) (“The only way to 
answer [the ACCA’s] backward-looking question is to consult the law that applied 
at the time of that conviction.”). 
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ACCA to a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence.65 This 
would be true even if the state did not call the crime 
burglary.66 
Moreover, if the statute of prior conviction is narrower 
than the generic offense—meaning it criminalizes less 
conduct than its generic counterpart—then the conviction 
likewise counts toward the enhancement.67 But if the statute 
of prior conviction is broader—meaning it criminalizes a 
broader swath of conduct, in any way—then the statute can 
never support an enhancement.68 As Justice Kagan so 
evocatively explained in Descamps v. United States, 
“Congress . . . meant [the] ACCA to function as an on-off 
switch, directing that a prior crime would qualify as a 
predicate offense in all cases or in none.”69 That is because, 
under the categorical approach, courts are only to consider 
the elements of the offense of prior conviction, never the 
actual conduct of the offender that led to the conviction.70 
 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2018). 
 66. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599–602 (“[T]here may be offenses under some States’ 
laws that, while not called ‘burglary,’ correspond in substantial part to generic 
burglary.”). 
 67. Id. at 599. See also Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257 (“The prior conviction 
qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or 
narrower than, those of the generic offense.”). 
 68. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). See also Descamps, 
570 U.S. at 268 (“Congress . . . meant [the] ACCA to function as an on-off switch, 
directing that a prior crime would qualify as a predicate offense in all cases or in 
none.”). 
 69. 570 U.S. at 268. 
 70. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. The Court explained: 
Facts, by contrast, are mere real-world things—extraneous to the 
crime’s legal requirements. (We have sometimes called them “brute 
facts” when distinguishing them from elements.) They are 
“circumstance[s]” or “event[s]” having no “legal effect [or] consequence”: 
In particular, they need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a 
defendant. And ACCA, as we have always understood it, cares not a whit 
about them. 
Id. (alterations and in original) (citations omitted). 
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b. The Problem of Imagining the Ordinary Case 
While Taylor created the categorical approach to deal 
directly with the ACCA enumerated offenses, the approach 
applies equally to all clauses within the ACCA’s definition of 
violent felony,71 including the prohibition on peeking into an 
offender’s actual prior conduct.72 Accordingly, if a defendant 
has a prior conviction for, say, driving while intoxicated, 
courts cannot examine the specific nature of the conduct 
surrounding that conviction when deciding whether it 
satisfies the residual clause.73 Instead, before Johnson, 
courts were left with the difficult task of examining the 
elements of the statute of prior conviction and then 
estimating the degree of risk involved in that crime’s 
imagined “ordinary case.”74 It is this process of 
imagination—a direct result of the categorical approach—
that proved ultimately unworkable. In Johnson, the 
defendant’s prior conviction in question was for possession of 
a short-barreled shotgun.75 Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, highlighted the difficulties of imagination: 
The present case, our fifth about the meaning of the residual clause,  
opens a new front of uncertainty. When deciding whether unlawful 
 
 71. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015) (“Taylor had 
good reasons to adopt the categorical approach, reasons that apply no less to the 
residual clause than to the enumerated crimes.”). 
 72. See id. (“[Taylor’s] emphasis on convictions indicates that ‘Congress 
intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been 
convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts 
underlying the prior convictions.’”) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). 
 73. E.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008) (applying the 
categorical approach to look only at the elements of the prior offense when 
evaluating whether driving while intoxicated satisfies the ACCA residual clause). 
 74. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. The Court worried: 
[T]he residual clause leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the 
risk posed by a crime. It ties the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially 
imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory 
elements. How does one go about deciding what kind of conduct the 
‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves? 
Id. 
 75. Id. at 2556. 
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possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony, do we 
confine our attention to the risk that the shotgun will go off by 
accident while in someone’s possession? Or do we also consider the 
possibility that the person possessing the shotgun will later use it 
to commit a crime? The inclusion of burglary and extortion among 
the enumerated offenses suggests that a crime may qualify under 
the residual clause even if the physical injury is remote from the 
criminal act. But how remote is too remote? Once again, the residual 
clause yields no answers.76 
Of all the talk of legal imagination, one fact required no 
imagination: without the ability to examine specific conduct, 
not only the United States Supreme Court but also lower 
courts were hopelessly divided on how to classify common 
crimes through the ACCA residual clause.77 Even worse, 
courts below could not even agree on “the nature of the 
inquiry” and “the kinds of factors one is supposed to 
consider.”78 Circuit splits abounded and consistency among 
the district courts was likely even more lacking.79 In the eyes 
of the majority, if any semblance of uniformity were to be 
reinstated, there was but one choice: the ACCA residual 
clause had to go.80 Thus, on June 26, 2015, the Court held in 
Johnson that the ACCA residual clause violates the 
Constitution’s guarantee of due process, specifically its 
 
 76. Id. at 2559. 
 77. Id. at 2559–60. 
 78. Id. at 2560. 
 79. See id. at 2559–60 (“This Court is not the only one that has had trouble 
making sense of the residual clause. The clause has ‘created numerous splits 
among the lower federal courts,’ where it has proved ‘nearly impossible to apply 
consistently.’”) (quoting Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133 (2009) 
(Alito, J., concurring)). 
 80. See id. at 2562–63. The Court reasoned: 
Although it is a vital rule of judicial self-government, stare decisis does 
not matter for its own sake. It matters because it “promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles.” Decisions under the residual clause have proved to be 
anything but evenhanded, predictable, or consistent. Standing by James 
and Sykes would undermine, rather than promote, the goals that stare 
decisis is meant to serve. 
Id. at 2563 (citation omitted). 
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prohibition of vague criminal laws.81 Almost exactly one year 
later, in Welch v. United States, the Court held that Johnson 
was retroactive in cases on collateral review.82 
C. How the ACCA Residual Clause Lives on by a Different 
Name 
The holdings of Johnson and Welch opened the door for 
relief to an enormous number of inmates sentenced under 
the ACCA, many of whom had already served more time than 
their current convictions allowed by law.83 This returns us to 
the Introduction’s real-world scenario: how did Rash enjoy 
the benefit of Johnson and Welch while Everett was left to 
serve his full, enhanced sentence when both of their 
sentencing enhancements were triggered by the same prior 
conviction (vehicular flight) under an identically worded 
residual clause? The answer to this question has to do with 
the Supreme Court’s view of the nature of the Guidelines and 
the role they play in federal sentencing. But first, the 
Guidelines provision at issue: the career-offender definition 
of “crime of violence.”84 
1. The Career Offender Guideline 
The Sentencing Commission created the career offender 
enhancement at Congress’s direction. As part of the 
 
 81. Id. at 2560, 2563 (“Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone 
to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee 
of due process.”). 
 82. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016) (“Johnson, however, 
struck down part of a criminal statute that regulates conduct and prescribes 
punishment. It thereby altered ‘the range of conduct or the class of persons that 
the law punishes.’ It follows that Johnson announced a substantive rule that has 
retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.”) (citation omitted). 
 83. The instant offense that triggers the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018), has 
a statutory maximum of ten years imprisonment if the ACCA does not apply. Id. 
§ 924(a)(2). Because the ACCA carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum, all 
improperly enhanced offenders would necessarily be serving an “illegal 
sentence.” See United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 84. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). 
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(h), which directed the newly formed Sentencing 
Commission to create a Guidelines provision that punishes 
certain repeat offenders “to a term of imprisonment at or 
near the maximum term authorized.”85 The Sentencing 
Commission thus drafted Guidelines Section 4B1.1, the 
career offender Guideline, and Section 4B1.2, its definitions 
provision.86 
In its original incarnation, effective 1987, the career 
offender Guideline did not have its own, independent 
definition of crime of violence but simply cross-referenced the 
statutory definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 16.87 It likewise did 
not provide a formal definition of “controlled substance 
offense” but rather listed several statutes that satisfied the 
term along with other “similar offenses.”88 A major change 
came in 1989 when the Sentencing Commission adopted the 
Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of violent felony, 
including its residual clause, as the career offender definition 
of crime of violence.89 Meanwhile, the Sentencing 
Commission used the Guidelines commentary to identify 
specific generic offenses that did or did not qualify as a crime 
of violence.90 This was the form of the career offender 
 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2018). 
 86. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1–.2 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 1987). 
 87. Id. § 4B1.2(1) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ as used in this provision is 
defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16.”). 
 88. Id. § 4B1.2(2) (“The term ‘controlled substance offense’ as used in this 
provision means an offense identified in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 952(a), 955, 955a, 959; 
§§ 405B and 416 of the Controlled Substance Act as amended in 1986, and similar 
offenses.”). 
 89. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 268 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 1989) (“The definition of crime of violence used in this 
amendment is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”). 
 90. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (“‘Crime of violence’ includes murder, manslaughter, 
kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, 
extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.”); see also id. (“‘Crime 
of violence’ does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a 
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Guideline when the Supreme Court decided Johnson.91 
2. Beckles v. United States 
Although Rash was sentenced as an armed career 
criminal, enhanced under the United States Code, and 
Everett was sentenced as a career offender, enhanced under 
the Guidelines,92 these differences would not have seemed 
significant at the time of Johnson because the career 
offender residual clause was textually identical to the ACCA 
residual clause: “or otherwise involves conduct that presents 
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”93 In 
fact, the Sentencing Commission expressly modeled the 
career offender Guideline after the ACCA.94 As such, both 
the Government and criminal defendants agreed, at the 
time, that the ACCA and career offender residual clauses 
shared the same fate under Johnson.95 
Johnson’s effect on the career offender Guideline was 
anticipated to benefit a larger number of offenders because, 
although it defined its terms almost identically to the ACCA, 
the career offender Guideline has a broader application than 
the ACCA: the career offender enhancement requires only 
two qualifying predicate offenses and the triggering instant 
 
felon, unless the possession was of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a).”). 
 91. A subsequent major change to Section 4B1.2 came in 2016 when the 
Sentencing Commission removed the Section 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause in light 
of Johnson and, at the same time, elevated a lengthy enumerated list of 
qualifying generic offenses from the commentary to the actual text of the 
Guideline. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, Supp., amend. 798 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 92. See supra Introduction. 
 93. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U. S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2011), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b) (2012). 
 94. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 268 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 1989) (“The definition of crime of violence used in this 
amendment is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”). 
 95. See Brief for the United States at 38–40, Beckles v. United States, 137 S. 
Ct. 886 (2017) (No. 15-8544) (“In light of those basic purposes of the vagueness 
doctrine, a district court’s use of a vague guideline to calculate an advisory 
Guidelines range violates the Due Process Clause.”). 
2018] THE ORWELL COURT 1033 
offense can be any crime of violence or controlled substance 
offense rather than the narrower range of offenses under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g).96 Moreover, depending on how events 
unfolded, even more offenders were potentially affected 
because a slew of other Guidelines provisions cross-
referenced the career-offender definition of crime of violence, 
including its residual clause.97  Because the Government and 
Beckles both agreed that Section 4B1.2’s residual clause did 
not survive Johnson, the Court appointed an amicus curiae 
to argue for keeping the Guidelines provision intact.98 
The general issue in Beckles was Johnson’s application 
to the career offender residual clause.99 The specific, 
constitutional issue was whether the Guidelines, by their 
advisory nature, are ever subject to a vagueness challenge 
under the Due Process Clause.100 Justice Thomas, writing for 
the majority, began by explaining that, under precedent, two 
types of laws are vulnerable to a constitutional vagueness 
challenge: (1) laws that define criminal offenses; and (2) laws 
that fix the permissible sentences for defendants.101 In 
 
 96. The Guideline states: 
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen 
years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of 
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either 
a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the 
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018). 
 97. Specifically, Guidelines Section 2K1.3 (offenses involving explosive 
materials), Section 2K2.1 (offenses involving firearms), Section 2S1.1 (money 
laundering), Section 4A1.1(e) (computation of criminal history category), Section 
4B1.1 (career offender enhancement), and Section 4B1.4 (armed career criminal 
enhancement) all increase a defendant’s base offense level if a prior conviction 
satisfies one or more of the Section 4B1.2 definitions. Id. §§ 2K1.3, 2K2.1, 2S1.1, 
4A1.1(e), 4B1.1, 4B1.4. 
 98. Beckles, 137 S. Ct at 892. 
 99. Id. at 890–92. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 892. 
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Beckles, the Court explained that in Johnson, it struck the 
ACCA residual clause as the second type because it did not 
“specify the range of available sentences with sufficient 
clarity,” increasing a defendant’s term of imprisonment from 
a ten year maximum to a fifteen year minimum based on 
unascertainable language.102 But as Justice Thomas 
explained, the Guidelines do not fix sentences; instead, after 
Booker, they merely “guide the exercise of a court’s discretion 
in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory 
range.”103 Therefore, because the Guidelines cannot be 
challenged as vague under the Due Process Clause, the Court 
held that the career-offender residual clause cannot be void 
for vagueness.104 
In light of Johnson, Rash was released from federal 
custody on September 9, 2016.105 In light of Beckles, Everett 
is not set for release until September 25, 2020.106 Although 
this seems patently unfair, fairness is rarely, if ever, a 
dispositive inquiry in federal sentencing law. The problem 
actually lurks much deeper, in the undercurrent of Beckles’s 
historical assumptions and its mischaracterization of the 
current role that the Guidelines play in federal sentencing 
practice. Part III will explore this terrain. 
III. THE MINISTRY OF TRUTH: BECKLES, BOOKER, BAD 
HISTORY, AND MISCHARACTERIZING THE ROLE THAT THE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES PLAY IN THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
SCHEME 
The holding of Beckles closed the door for relief to 
defendants whose base offense level was increased through 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (use the “Find by Name” tab; then input “Oscar” 
in the first name field and “Rash” in the last name field; then select “Search”). 
 106. Id. (use the “Find by Name” tab; then input “Laneer” in the first name 
field and “Everett” in the last name field; then select “Search”). 
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the residual clause of the career-offender Guideline. The 
sentences of career offenders remained while many armed 
career criminals were seeing their sentences vacated, even 
with the same criminal history. All the while, the Supreme 
Court made assurances that the disparate treatment of these 
categories of offenders was on sound constitutional footing. 
The Court, however, reached this conclusion based on two 
mischaracterizations: a historical mischaracterization of the 
impact of United States v. Booker on the federal sentencing 
scheme; and a present mischaracterization of the role of the 
Guidelines in federal sentencing today. This confluence of 
mischaracterizations formed a false narrative that the 
Guidelines offer “mere guidance” in our system, thus 
inoculating them from vagueness concerns and preserving 
the sentences of career offenders in light of Johnson.107 
The reasoning of Beckles is rooted not in the text of the 
Guidelines’ residual clause but in the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of the impact of Booker on federal sentencing. 
Beckles depends upon one fundamental premise: that 
Booker’s twin holdings, in large part, returned the federal 
criminal sentencing scheme to one of indeterminate 
sentencing, as it was prior to the imposition of the 
Guidelines.108 In doing so, the Court grossly understated the 
role that the advisory Guidelines continue to play in federal 
sentencing after Booker. Certain aspects of the role of 
 
 107. See Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892. In Beckles, the Court promulgated: 
Unlike the ACCA, however, the advisory Guidelines do not fix the 
permissible range of sentences. To the contrary, they merely guide the 
exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence 
within the statutory range. Accordingly, the Guidelines are not subject 
to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. The residual 
clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) therefore is not void for vagueness. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 108. See id. at 893–94 (“The Guidelines were initially binding on district 
courts, but this Court in Booker rendered them ‘effectively advisory.’ . . . The 
Guidelines thus continue to guide district courts in exercising their discretion by 
serving as ‘the framework for sentencing,’ but they ‘do not constrain that 
discretion.’”) (alteration and citations omitted). 
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advisory Guidelines in federal sentencing were perhaps 
unforeseeable to the Court in Booker, but were certainly 
known by the time the Court decided Beckles. In short, the 
holding of Beckles is as good as its history, and Beckles’s 
evolved historical understanding of Booker’s impact and the 
current role of the Guidelines in federal sentencing led the 
Court down a misguided path with ongoing consequences. 
A. Contextualizing United States v. Booker: A Short 
History of Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing  
Because the federal court system covers such a wide 
range of territory, with diverse regional views of justice, it 
has been plagued, since inception, with the problem of 
sentencing disparity. Liberal and conservative critics alike 
have historically called for more sentencing uniformity—
even if for different reasons.109 As a result, the federal 
sentencing scheme has undergone a series of changes over 
time with an eye toward reducing disparity by limiting a 
district court’s ability to decide how much time a defendant 
will actually serve in prison. These efforts have benefitted 
offenders, on the one hand, by vesting decision-making 
power with bodies other than Congress and the judiciary that 
can mitigate overly long sentences of imprisonment. They 
have been a detriment to offenders, on the other hand, when 
Congress has protected against overly lenient sentences by 
imposing mandatory minimum sentences, reducing good-
time credit, and eliminating parole. Either way, whether fair 
or not, judicial discretion has been squarely blamed for 
sentencing disparity and has, in some form or another, been 
the target of these changes. These developments are 
important to consider because courts’ understandings of the 
nature, history, and extent of judicial sentencing discretion 
have, in recent years, played a critical role in how those 
courts have evaluated the impact of a successful statutory 
 
 109. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The 
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
223, 227–28 (1993). 
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void-for-vagueness challenge. 
1. Sentencing Before the Guidelines (origin–1987) 
a. A System of Indeterminate Sentencing 
At the outset of our federal criminal system, the only two 
players in the sentencing game were Congress and the 
federal district courts. Congress would set the statutory 
sentencing range for each federal crime (a statutory 
maximum and sometimes a mandatory minimum), which 
was often very wide, and district courts were free to impose 
a sentence anywhere within that range.110 This “system of 
indeterminate sentencing” included decisions regarding the 
length of incarceration and whether probation should 
substitute for a sentence of imprisonment or a fine.111 And 
because sentencing decisions, at the time, enjoyed little or no 
appellate review,112 this wide discretion brought equally 
wide sentencing disparity.113 
 
 110. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–64 (1989) (“For almost a 
century, the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of 
indeterminate sentencing. Statutes specified the penalties for crimes but nearly 
always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion . . . .”). 
 111. Id. at 363. 
 112. See Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917) (“ [T]he 
question of the nature of the sentence was one which rested in the discretion of 
the court below, a discretion which will not be reviewed in this court in any case 
where the punishment assessed is within the statutory limits.”). 
 113. In January 1960, The Atlantic published an article by United States 
District Court Judge Irving R. Kaufman in which the Judge illustrated the 
problem: 
[T]he average sentence for auto theft in the federal courts of eastern 
Oklahoma was thirty-six months, while in New Hampshire the average 
commitment for the same crime was less than a year. . . . [And], the 
average prison sentence meted out in the federal courts ranged from 9 
months in Vermont to 58 months in southern Iowa. . . . [T]he disparity 
in different sentences for the same offense seems unfair. 
Irving R. Kaufman, Sentencing: The Judge’s Problem, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 
1960, at 40. 
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b. “Good Conduct Time” 
The first significant effort to mitigate the harsh effects of 
wide judicial sentencing discretion came on March 3, 1875, 
when Congress passed legislation providing inmates with a 
credited reduction to their sentences for time with “no charge 
of misconduct” or “good conduct time.”114 The original version 
of this good-time statute gave inmates a five day reduction 
in their overall sentence for each month they did not receive 
a charge of misconduct.115 These rules were changed from 
time to time, for most of their history, to increase an 
offender’s good-time credit. For example, on June 25, 1948, 
Congress refined the good conduct time computation rules, 
crediting inmates with up to ten days per month on 
sentences of ten years or more.116 For much of its history, up 
until 1984,117 good conduct time remained at this level.118 
c. The Federal Parole System 
Congress’s next significant step came on June 25, 1910, 
 
 114. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 145, 18 Stat. 479. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 4161, 62 Stat. 683, 853. 
Specifically, an inmate would receive credit for: (1) five days per month on a 
sentence of six months to one year imprisonment; (2) six days per month on a 
sentence of more than one year and less than three years imprisonment; (3) seven 
days per month on a sentence of at least three years and less than five years 
imprisonment; (4) eight days per month on a sentence at least five years and less 
than ten years imprisonment; and (5) ten days per month on a sentence ten years 
imprisonment or more. Id. These credits, of course, assumed that the inmate had 
“faithfully observed all the rules and ha[d] not been subjected to punishment” 
that month. Id. 
 117. In the time after the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, described more fully 
below, Congress has dramatically reduced the amount of good time available—to 
54 days per year—while simultaneously making the credit more difficult to earn, 
requiring a full year of “exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary 
regulations.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2018). Any violation will generally result in 
no good conduct credit awarded for the year. Id. (“[I]f the Bureau determines that, 
during that year, the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with such 
institutional regulations, the prisoner shall receive no such credit toward service 
of the prisoner’s sentence or shall receive such lesser credit as the Bureau 
determines to be appropriate.”). 
 118. See Stith & Koh, supra note 109, at 226 n.10. 
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when it enacted legislation implementing a system of parole 
for federal prisoners.119 This new system provided an 
opportunity for release, under the “guidance and control” of 
a corrections official,120 to federal inmates who were 
sentenced to more than a year imprisonment and had served 
at least one-third of their total sentence.121 Congress 
entrusted the decision of whether to release an inmate on 
parole to each prison’s new parole board, which would review 
eligible inmates’ behavior while incarcerated and evaluate 
whether there was a reasonable probability that the inmate 
“will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws.”122 
This new system curbed a district court’s ability to control 
the actual length of a defendant’s time in prison, which could, 
at that time, be reduced by up to two-thirds. Congress then 
created a centralized United States Board of Parole (later the 
Parole Commission) in 1930, which provided oversight of the 
individual federal prison boards.123 Still, disparities in the 
actual length of incarceration remained common.124 
d. The United States Parole Commission 
In 1976, Congress passed the Parole Commission and 
Reorganization Act, which sought to systemize how federal 
parole boards evaluated inmates.125 This Act created a nine-
member United States Parole Commission (Parole 
Commission), within the Department of Justice, tasked with 
crafting guidelines to govern whether an inmate’s 
 
 119. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-269, 36 Stat. 819. 
 120. See Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938). 
 121. Act of June 25, 1910 § 1. 
 122. Id. §§ 2–3. 
 123. Act of May 13, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-202, 46 Stat. 272. See also U.S.A. ex 
rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156, 1167 (3d Cir. 1985) (“In 1930, Congress 
created the United States Board of Parole.”). 
 124. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–66 (1989). 
 125. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, sec. 2, 
§§ 4201–4218, 90 Stat. 219, 219–231(1976). 
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application for parole should be granted or denied.126 The 
stated goal was threefold: (1) to establish a national paroling 
policy; (2) to increase consistency; and (3) to create a fairer 
decision-making process while still allowing for case-by-case 
consideration.127 In short, Congress sought to decrease 
regional disparity in the actual amount of time similarly 
situated inmates served in federal prison. 
The parole guidelines evaluated inmates based on their 
offense of conviction as well as their past criminal conduct, 
which were then reduced to numerical values.128 These two 
values formed the x- and y-axes of a grid, which ultimately 
recommended a range of imprisonment in months.129 These 
parole guidelines are the clear predecessor to the Guidelines 
that have come to drive so many sentencing decisions 
thereafter.130 The parole guidelines also demonstrated a 
desire for uniformity and fairness: uniformity by way of 
systematic guidance; fairness by way of an executive-branch 
agency that could mitigate harsh exercises of judicial 
discretion. Just as with good conduct time, Congress 
drastically changed course in 1984. 
e. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
The Sentencing Reform Act,131 part of the larger 
 
 126. Id. sec. 2, §§ 4202–03. It is speculated the Parole Commission was using 
informal “pilot” guidelines as early as 1972. Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. 
Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission, 1985–
1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1171 n.27 (2017). 
 127. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(a) (1986). 
 128. See id. § 2.20(b)–(e). 
 129. See id. § 2.20(j); Newton & Sidhu, supra note 126, at 172. 
 130. Although more simplistic, the parole guidelines bore the same structure 
as the future sentencing guidelines and were even drafted by Peter Hoffman, a 
future staffer for the Sentencing Commission. Newton & Sidhu, supra note 126, 
at 1171–73. 
 131. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) (the Act was held in 
abeyance during the drafting of the Guidelines and therefore did not become 
applicable until 1987). 
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Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,132 was the first of 
two watershed events in the history of modern federal 
sentencing law, and arguably remains the most 
significant.133 With one stroke of the President’s pen, the Act 
abolished the federal parole system, dramatically reduced 
the availability of good conduct time, and created the 
Sentencing Commission, an independent agency within the 
judicial branch.134 This new Sentencing Commission was 
tasked with promulgating mandatory guidelines for 
sentencing, which would bind judicial sentencing discretion. 
The intricacies of the legislative history and the political 
context in which the Act arose are complex and fascinating, 
but beyond the scope of this article.135 Needless to say, it was 
a coup for critics from the right who viewed judicial 
discretion and the Parole Commission as unwanted 
instruments of leniency.136 The effect of the Act, however, is 
central: the Act forced a federal district court’s judicial 
discretion to its historical nadir.137 It also began a prolonged 
battle between the Government and federal defendants over 
various aspects of the relationship between the Guidelines, 
the United States Code, and a district court’s discretion—a 
battle which continues today. 
  
 
 132. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1837 (1984). 
 133. The other event is the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which is described below. 
 134. See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 126, at 1175–76. 
 135. For a thorough and impressive discussion of these matters, see Stith & 
Koh, supra note 109. 
 136. See id. at 223–24 (describing how the Act was initially conceived by liberal 
reformers but later morphed into conservative law-and-order legislation). 
 137. See id. at 270 (describing the Sentencing Reform Act’s “extraordinary 
transfer” of discretion from the district court to the Sentencing Commission). 
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2. Sentencing under the Mandatory Guidelines (1987–
2005) 
a. The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
The first United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
(Guidelines Manual) went into effect on November 1, 1987. 
The new Guidelines, coupled with Congress’s decision to 
make them mandatory,138 marked the end of the system of 
indeterminate sentencing.139 It was the product of 
approximately three years of study, meetings, and review by 
the newly formed Sentencing Commission. In many ways, 
the Guidelines were a refinement, albeit a good one, of the 
prior parole guidelines put into place in 1976. More 
importantly, the decisions were now being made by the 
Sentencing Commission, not a parole board. Still, even 
though discretion over how long a defendant would actually 
spend in prison was now back within the judicial branch of 
government, it was not given directly to the district courts. 
This is because, at their inception, the Guidelines were 
predominately binding upon courts.140 
b. Judicial Discretion under the Guidelines 
Judicial sentencing discretion under the mandatory 
Guidelines was limited. By statute, Congress instructed 
district courts to impose a sentence within the applicable 
Guidelines range “unless there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance” that the Sentencing Commission 
did not adequately consider when formulating the 
Guidelines.141 Appellate review of sentencing was likewise 
limited, primarily serving the oversight function of ensuring 
 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988). 
 139. See Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, 
Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 Hastings L.J. 533, 539 (2007) (“Sentencing 
guidelines, a form of ‘determinate sentencing,’ emerged as a cure for these 
perceived failures of indeterminate sentencing.”). 
 140. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005)). 
 141. Id. § 3553(b). 
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that the sentencing court properly calculated the Guidelines 
sentencing range.142 But well before the Supreme Court 
struck the mandatory Guidelines in Booker, confidence in the 
constitutionality of the Guidelines, especially as it related to 
judicial discretion, was eroding. This is because the very 
process of calculating the Guidelines sentencing range 
required a district court to engage in judicial factfinding by 
a lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.143 
3. Changing Winds: Growing Skepticism over the Role of 
Judicial Factfinding in Sentencing (2000–2005) 
The second watershed moment in modern federal 
sentencing law was United States v. Booker, in which the 
Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory only.144 To 
understand Booker, however, one must understand a few 
preceding developments. The story of Booker actually begins 
five years earlier with Apprendi v. New Jersey.145 
a. Apprendi v. New Jersey 
In Apprendi, a defendant had pleaded guilty to two 
counts of “possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,” 
which were each punishable in New Jersey by up to ten years 
imprisonment.146 After the defendant pleaded, but before he 
was sentenced, the sentencing judge held a hearing inquiring 
into the defendant’s motivation for his crime.147 Based on the 
court’s judicial factfinding, by a preponderance of the 
 
 142. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988) (abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005)); Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After 
Booker, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2008). 
 143. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2000) (“The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the 
evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy 
concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts 
of a case.”). 
 144. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46. 
 145. See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 146. Id. at 469–70. 
 147. Id. at 470. 
1044 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
evidence, that the defendant was motivated by “racial bias,” 
the court increased the defendant’s sentencing exposure to 
twenty years per count.148 After the court sentenced the 
defendant to twelve years imprisonment on one of the counts, 
the defendant appealed, under the Due Process Clause, the 
court’s method of increasing his statutory maximum.149 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any fact that 
increases a crime’s statutory maximum, other than the fact 
of a prior conviction,150 must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.151 The Court rooted its holding in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process, in 
conjunction with the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by 
jury.152 In doing so, the Court’s holding was a marriage of 
earlier decisions in which it had held that due process 
“protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged”153 and that 
the right to a jury trial entitles a defendant to “a jury 
determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the 
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”154 
 
 148. Id. at 470–71. 
 149. Id. at 471. 
 150. The “prior conviction” exception refers to the Court’s perennially 
controversial holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 151. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 152. Id. at 499–500. Relying on precedent, the Court explained: 
We there noted that ‘under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the 
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ The 
Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case 
involving a state statute. 
Id. at 476 (citation omitted). 
 153. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 154. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995). 
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b. Ring v. Arizona 
Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court 
decided another state case in which a defendant’s sentencing 
exposure was increased by post-conviction judicial 
factfinding.155 In Ring, a defendant was convicted of felony 
murder in Arizona state court.156 Under Arizona law, a felony 
murder conviction could only qualify for the death penalty if 
one or more aggravating factors accompanied the crime.157 
After the defendant’s conviction, but before his sentencing, 
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and made a 
finding of two aggravating factors.158 As a result, the court 
entered a “special verdict” of death.159 The defendant 
challenged his death sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, 
arguing that aggravating factors, that increase sentencing 
exposure, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.160 
Although the Supreme Court had already approved of 
Arizona’s death penalty sentencing scheme a decade earlier 
in Walton v. Arizona,161 its approach to the Sixth 
Amendment had changed. The rule was now simpler: other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, if a factual finding 
increases sentencing exposure, it must be found by a jury 
 
 155. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588–89 (2002). 
 156. Id. at 591. 
 157. Id. at 592. 
 158. Id. at 594–95. 
 159. Id. at 594. 
 160. Id. at 597. 
 161. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). There the Court said: 
If the Constitution does not require that the Enmund finding be proved 
as an element of the offense of capital murder, and does not require a 
jury to make that finding, we cannot conclude that a State is required to 
denominate aggravating circumstances ‘elements’ of the offense or 
permit only a jury to determine the existence of such circumstances. We 
thus conclude that the Arizona capital sentencing scheme does not 
violate the Sixth Amendment. 
Id. at 649. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. And Arizona’s “aggravating 
circumstances” finding violated Apprendi’s rule.162 As a 
result, the Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s sentence 
and abrogated its prior holding in Walton.163 
c. Blakely v. Washington 
Two years after Ring, the Supreme Court once again took 
up the issue of a state district court’s discretion to increase a 
sentence based on judicial factfinding.164 This time, however, 
the district court’s factfinding did not result in a sentence 
above the state legislature’s maximum punishment for the 
crime; instead, the factfinding merely caused the court to 
sentence above the state’s guideline range.165 The result of 
Blakely, which considered the interplay between the 
legislature’s statutory range and a guidelines-based 
sentencing system, would foreshadow how the Court would 
approach the Guidelines soon thereafter. 
In Blakely, a defendant pleaded guilty to “second-degree 
kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a 
firearm,”166 which was punishable by up to ten years 
imprisonment.167 As part of his plea agreement, the 
defendant admitted to the elements of the offense but no 
other relevant facts.168 Under a system of indeterminate 
sentencing, the state district judge would have had 
discretion to sentence the defendant to any term of 
 
 162. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding 
necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding 
necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to 
both.”) 
 163. Id. at 603 (“[W]e are persuaded that Walton, in relevant part, cannot 
survive the reasoning of Apprendi.”). 
 164. See generally Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 165. Id. at 298–99. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 299. 
 168. Id. 
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imprisonment up to, and including, ten years. Washington 
state, however, had put into place a guidelines system that 
limited judicial sentencing discretion to a “standard range” 
unless the court found “substantial and compelling reasons 
justifying an exceptional sentence.”169 Under Washington’s 
guidelines, the standard range for the defendant’s offense 
was a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months 
imprisonment.170 After the defendant’s plea, but before 
sentencing, the district court held a three day evidentiary 
hearing to gather facts about the defendant’s crime.171 
Afterward, the court issued thirty-two findings of fact, 
including a determination of “deliberate cruelty.”172 Based on 
this determination, the court sentenced the defendant to 
ninety months imprisonment.173 
Justice Scalia, writing for a narrow majority, expanded 
upon the rule of Apprendi by casting a wider definition of 
“statutory maximum.” Now, a crime’s statutory maximum 
was not just the hard ceiling set by the legislature, but could 
be case fact- and case-specific: “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ 
for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”174 And when the 
district court engaged in factfinding that increased the 
defendant’s sentence above the standard range, it violated 
Apprendi.175 Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded 
for resentencing.176 In her dissent, Justice O’Connor 
recognized Blakely’s threat to the Guidelines.177 But just a 
 
 169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 2000). 
 170. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. 
 171. Id. at 300–01. 
 172. Id. at 298, 300–01. 
 173. Id. at 298–99. 
 174. Id. at 303. 
 175. See id. at 304–05. 
 176. Id. at 314. 
 177. Id. at 303. Justice O’Connor noted: 
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year later, the momentum of Apprendi would prove too much 
to resist. 
d. United States v. Booker’s Constitutional Holding 
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided United States v. 
Booker, which considered the cases of two defendants, 
Freddie Booker and Ducan Fanfan, whose sentencing ranges 
under the Guidelines were increased as a result of judicial 
factfinding.178 
Booker was charged with possession of fifty grams or 
more of crack cocaine, which had a statutory sentencing 
range of ten years to life imprisonment.179 The jury convicted 
Booker after considering evidence that he possessed ninety-
two and one-half grams of crack in his duffel bag.180 
Combined with Booker’s criminal history, this produced a 
Guideline sentencing range of 210 to 262 months 
imprisonment.181 At his sentencing hearing, however, the 
district court concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and 
that he had obstructed justice.182 These findings resulted in 
a new sentencing range of 360 months to life 
imprisonment.183 The district court sentenced Booker, under 
the enhanced range, to 360 months imprisonment.184 
 
The consequences of today’s decision will be as far reaching as they are 
disturbing. Washington’s sentencing system is by no means unique. 
Numerous other States have enacted guidelines systems, as has the 
Federal Government. Today’s decision casts constitutional doubt over 
them all and, in so doing, threatens an untold number of criminal 
judgments. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 178. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–30 (2005). 
 179. Id. at 227. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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Fanfan was charged with conspiracy to distribute and 
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 
cocaine,185 which had a statutory sentencing range of five to 
forty years imprisonment.186 In arriving at a conviction, the 
jury answered “yes” to the question, “Was the amount of 
cocaine 500 or more grams?”187 Combined with Fanfan’s 
criminal history, the jury’s finding produced a Guideline 
sentencing range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months 
imprisonment.188 At his sentencing hearing, however, the 
district court concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that Fanfan possessed two and one-half kilograms of cocaine, 
261.6 grams of crack, and had been an organizer-leader of 
the criminal scheme.189 These findings resulted in a new 
sentencing range of 188 to 235 months imprisonment.190 The 
district court, however, heeded Blakely and declined to 
impose an increased sentence based on its judicial 
factfinding.191 
The Court recognized that the cases before it presented 
two questions: (1) whether the Apprendi line of cases applied 
to the Guidelines; and (2) if so, what portions of the 
Guidelines remained in effect.192 Because a different 
 
 185. Id. at 228. 
 186. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 187. Booker, 543 U.S. at 228. 
 188. United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-47-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593, at 
*5 (D. Me. June 28, 2004). 
 189. Booker, 543 U.S. at 228. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Fanfan, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593, at *12–14. The District Judge 
stated: 
Accordingly, following Blakely, I conclude that it is unconstitutional for 
me to apply the federal guideline enhancements in the sentence of 
Duncan Fanfan, which is to say, an increase in the drug quantity beyond 
that found by the jury, or any role enhancement. To do so would 
unconstitutionally impinge upon Mr. Fanfan’s Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial as explained by Blakely. 
Id. at *12. 
 192. Booker, 543 U.S. at 229. 
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majority coalesced around the answer to each question, 
Booker actually produced two opinions: its constitutional 
holding, written by Justice Stevens, to answer the first 
question,193 and its remedial holding,194 written by Justice 
Breyer, to answer the second question.195 
The Court answered the constitutional question in the 
affirmative, holding that the Apprendi rule, particularly as 
most recently articulated in Blakely, applied to the 
Guidelines.196 The Court based its conclusion on the 
Guidelines’ mandatory nature. According to the Court, if the 
Guidelines were not binding on judges, but advisory only, the 
Sixth Amendment implications so central to Apprendi would 
disappear.197 As in Blakely, the problem was not resolved 
simply by the defendants’ sentences being within the 
legislature’s statutory maximum or by the judge having the 
authority to depart from the standard range.198 This is 
because the mandatory nature of the Guidelines required the 
court to engage in judicial factfinding as a prerequisite to an 
enhanced sentencing range. Such a requirement impinged 
upon the jury’s role of finding any fact (other than a prior 
conviction) that raised a sentence above the statutory range, 
 
 193. Id. at 230–44. 
 194. Id. at 244–68 (2005). 
 195. Id. at 244–68. 
 196. Id. at 244. In the words of the Court: 
Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact (other than 
a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding 
the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or 
a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. 
 197. Id. at 233 (“If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely 
advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of 
particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not 
implicate the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 198. See id. at 234 (“The availability of a departure in specified circumstances 
does not avoid the constitutional issue, just as it did not in Blakely itself.”) 
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as defined in Blakely.199 Therefore, the Guidelines, as they 
were being applied, violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment 
rights.200 The question then became what to do about it. 
4. Sentencing Under the Advisory Guidelines (2005–
present) 
a. United States v. Booker’s Remedial Holding 
In many ways, Booker was the inevitable consequence of 
Blakely. The dissenting judges in Blakely saw what was 
coming clear enough, which is why the dissents in Blakely 
were filled with constructive alternatives to the majority’s 
scorched-earth approach.201 Perhaps, the minority judges 
reasoned, a compromise could be reached. And the curious 
dual-coalition opinion in Booker reflects just that sort of 
backroom bargaining,202 which ultimately left the Guidelines 
almost fully intact. Much to the chagrin of the justices who 
fought to strike down the Guidelines’ determinate sentencing 
scheme, the solution was not a bang but a whimper. The 
Court would simply excise two statutes that governed the 
application of the Guidelines: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),203 
 
 199. See id. at 244. 
 200. See id. at 244–45. 
 201. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 330–40 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 202. See Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal 
Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 716–17 (2005). 
 203. The statute states: 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence 
of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless 
the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. 
In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into 
consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, 
policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing 
Commission. In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the 
court shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the 
purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable 
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which made the Guidelines mandatory, and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(e),204 which governed appellate review of sentencing. 
 
sentencing guideline in the case of an offense other than a petty offense, 
the court shall also have due regard for the relationship of the sentence 
imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar 
offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the 
Sentencing Commission. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018). 
 204. The statue states: 
Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether 
the sentence— 
(1) was imposed in violation of law; 
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the 
sentencing guidelines; 
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and 
(A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of 
reasons required by section 3553(c) [18 USCS § 3553(c)]; 
(B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range 
based on a factor that— 
(i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section 
3553(a)(2) [18 USCS § 3553(a)(2)]; or 
(ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b) [18 USCS 
§ 3553(b)]; or 
(iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or 
(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the 
applicable guidelines range, having regard for the factors to be 
considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in section 
3553(a) of this title [18 USCS § 3553(a)] and the reasons for the 
imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district 
court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c) [18 USCS 
§ 3553(c)]; or 
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable 
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable. 
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the 
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept 
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous 
and, except with respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or 
(3)(B), shall give due deference to the district court’s application of the 
guidelines to the facts. With respect to determinations under subsection 
(3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de novo the district 
court’s application of the guidelines to the facts. 
Id. § 3742(e). 
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Everything else remained the same, including judicial 
factfinding. But now judicial factfinding, even when it 
increased the Guidelines sentencing range, was authorized 
because, according to the Court, advisory Guidelines do not 
present Sixth Amendment concerns.205 
b. The Three-Step Sentencing Process 
After Booker, federal district courts follow a three-step 
process when sentencing a defendant. First, courts properly 
determine the applicable advisory sentencing range under 
the Guidelines.206 Second, courts consider the applicability of 
any departure provisions within the Guidelines.207 Third, 
courts consider the statutory sentencing factors codified in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),208 which include the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant,209 to impose a sentence 
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with 
the statutory sentencing purposes.210 As is clear on its 
surface, this process continues to give significant weight to 
the Guidelines. And over time, since Booker, the role of the 
Guidelines has continued to increase. 
B. More Than a Decade after Booker: The Present Role of 
the Guidelines in Federal Sentencing 
When the Supreme Court salvaged the Guidelines by 
 
 205. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. (“If the Guidelines as currently written could be 
read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the 
selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use 
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 206. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016). See also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (“The 
sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally begin by considering the 
presentence report and its interpretation of the Guidelines.”). 
 207. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(b). 
 208. Id. § 1B1.1(c). 
 209. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). 
 210. Id. 
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rendering them advisory, it failed to appreciate fully the role 
that the Guidelines would continue to play in federal 
sentencing. When the Supreme Court held years later, in 
Beckles, that the Guidelines are not subject to vagueness 
challenges, it grossly understated what was then known 
about the Guidelines’ continued influence after Booker. 
These shortcomings led the Court to render a holding that 
was fundamentally dissonant with the realities of federal 
sentencing. 
Booker did not return the federal sentencing scheme to 
indeterminacy, as Beckles at times suggests.211 It was 
instead a compromise opinion212 that left the Guidelines 
intact. It also allowed the Guidelines to continue to guide 
district court’s sentencing practices just as before. As one 
recent commentator has observed, after Booker “there is good 
reason to believe that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are, 
at best, extremely influential on sentencing and, at worst, 
effectively binding.”213 
According to Sentencing Commission data and analysis, 
federal sentencing practices changed very little as a result of 
Booker. For example, according to the Sentencing 
Commission’s 2012 “Booker Report,” the average sentence—
for all federal offenders across all jurisdictions—from 1996 to 
2003 was forty-nine months; the average sentence from 2007 
to 2011 was also forty-nine months.214 Comparing these 
same two periods, the percentage of federal sentences that 
were within-Guidelines or below-Guidelines based on a 
 
 211. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017) (explaining that 
the Guidelines “merely guide the district courts’ discretion” but “do not constrain 
that discretion”). 
 212. It is widely believed that Justice Ginsburg “defected” from the dissent in 
Booker’s remedial opinion to the majority in order to salvage the Guidelines. See, 
e.g., Klein, supra note 202, at 716–17. 
 213. Veronica Saltzman, Note, Redefining Violence in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 532 (2018). 
 214. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED 
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 58 (2012). 
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Government-sponsored motion was 83.9% before Booker and 
80.7% after Booker.215 Since the Booker Report, the 
Sentencing Commission has reported a slight decrease in 
these numbers, with 78.6% of sentences from fiscal years 
2011 to 2015 either within-Guidelines or below-Guidelines 
based on a Government motion.216 This data demonstrates 
that Booker’s practical effect has proved marginal. 
This practical reality was also by the Supreme Court’s 
design. In Booker, the Court held that sentencing courts 
must continue to “consider” the properly calculated 
Guidelines sentencing range.217 Later, in Pepper v. United 
States, the Court clarified that sentencing courts owe the 
Guidelines “respectful consideration.”218 Still later, in 
Molina-Martinez v. United States, the Court explained, “the 
Guidelines are not only the starting point for most federal 
sentencing proceedings but also the lodestar.”219 
After Booker, sentencing courts are not only still charged 
with consideration of the Guidelines, but it is reversible error 
if they misinterpret or misapply a Guidelines provision, or 
miscalculate the proper Guidelines sentencing range.220 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIGURE G: COMPARISON OF SENTENCE IMPOSED 
AND POSITION OF SENTENCE RELATIVE TO THE GUIDELINE RANGE BY YEAR (2015) 
(available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/FigureG.pdf) (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2018). 
 217. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (requiring 
sentencing courts to consider Guidelines ranges). 
 218. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S 475, 476 (2011). 
 219. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016). 
 220. See United States v. Olarte-Rojas, 820 F.3d 798, 805 (5th Cir. 2016) The 
Fifth Circuit explained: 
While the Guidelines are advisory in light of United States v. Booker, 
district courts still must properly calculate the applicable guidelines 
range before imposing a sentence. The incorrect application of the 
Guidelines that results in an erroneous calculation of the total offense 
level and the guidelines sentencing range is an obvious error or mistake 
that almost certainly would result in a remand. 
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Additionally, if a court’s sentencing varies outside the 
properly calculated Guidelines range, it is reversible error to 
not state a good reason for doing so.221 Moreover, after 
Booker, courts of appeals are charged with reviewing all 
sentences, whether within the Guidelines range or not, for 
substantive reasonableness.222 But only sentences outside 
the properly calculated Guidelines range are reviewed 
without a presumption of reasonableness.223 Additionally, an 
appellate court will review for substantive reasonableness 
the degree to which a sentencing court upwardly varies 
above the advisory Guidelines range.224 
All of these observations rebut the Court’s erroneous 
claim in Beckles that the post-Booker Guidelines “merely 
guide the district courts’ discretion” but “do not constrain 
that discretion.”225 In fact, as illustrated above, the 
Guidelines, both before and after Booker, dramatically 
constrain a district court’s sentencing discretion. And 
because the holding in Beckles rested squarely on the Court’s 
misplaced view of post-Booker sentencing discretion, the 
holding that the Guidelines are not vulnerable to vagueness 
challenges is equally misplaced. 
 
Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2018) (requiring sentencing courts to properly 
calculate the applicable Guidelines range). 
 221. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356–58 (2007) (“Sometimes the 
circumstances will call for a brief explanation; sometimes they will call for a 
lengthier explanation. Where the judge imposes a sentence outside the 
Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has done so.”). See also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(c)(2) (requiring a sentencing court to state a “specific reason” for a 
sentence outside the Guidelines range). 
 222. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2007) (explaining 
that even a within-Guidelines sentence is subject to reasonableness review). 
 223. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“If the sentence is within 
the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a 
presumption of reasonableness. But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines 
range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness.”). 
 224. Id. at 46–47 (“In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the 
Guidelines range, appellate courts may therefore take the degree of variance into 
account and consider the extent of deviation from the Guidelines.”). 
 225. Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017). 
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C. An Evolving View of the Role of the Guidelines in 
Sentencing: The Uneasy Relationship between Beckles 
and United States v. Peugh 
Not only is Beckles misguided in its understanding of the 
role of the Guidelines after Booker, its reasoning is also at 
odds with a recent predecessor opinion, United States v. 
Peugh.226 In Peugh, decided in 2013, the Court analyzed 
whether the advisory Guidelines were subject to a different 
constitutional concern: the Ex Post Facto Clause.227 
The United States Constitution prohibits Congress, as 
well as the states, from passing ex post facto laws.228 The 
Supreme Court has defined “ex post facto laws” as including 
“[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, 
when committed.”229 As the Sentencing Commission 
promulgates new Guidelines, which it does nearly every 
year, the advisory sentencing range for the same offender 
sometimes increases between the time he committed the 
crime and the time he is sentenced. Such was the case for 
Marvin Peugh. 
Peugh was in the agriculture business, holding a stake 
in two companies: one bought, stored, and sold grain; the 
other provided farming services to landowners and 
tenants.230 When Peugh and his business partner fell behind 
financially, they attempted to stay afloat by engaging in a 
scheme of bank fraud and “check kiting.”231 The scheme 
eventually came to light and, around ten years after the 
commission of the offense, a jury convicted Peugh of five 
 
 226. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013). 
 227. Id. at 532–33. 
 228. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed [by 
Congress].”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto 
Law.”). 
 229. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). 
 230. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 533. 
 231. Id. 
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counts of bank fraud.232 The district court calculated Peugh’s 
advisory sentencing range at seventy to eighty-seven months 
imprisonment under the version of the Guidelines in effect 
at the time of sentencing.233 Peugh objected, arguing that his 
advisory sentencing range should be thirty-seven to forty-six 
months imprisonment, which it would have been under the 
version of the Guidelines in effect at the time he committed 
the offense.234 The district court overruled Peugh’s objection 
and sentenced him to seventy months imprisonment.235 The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed, following its own precedent that 
the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to the advisory 
Guidelines.236 
On review, the Supreme Court began its analysis by 
establishing that the ex post facto inquiry depends on 
“whether a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of 
increasing the measure of punishment attached to the 
covered crimes.’”237 While the Court had previously held in 
Miller v. Florida that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to the 
Florida guidelines’ scheme,238 some federal courts of appeals, 
such as the Seventh Circuit, later interpreted Booker to 
undercut Miller’s application to the federal Guidelines on the 
basis “that ‘Booker demoted the Guidelines from rules to 
advice.’”239 In response to this sentiment, the Court outlined 
 
 232. Peugh committed the offenses in 1999 and 2000; he was sentenced in May 
2010. Id. at 533–34. 
 233. Id. at 534. 
 234. Id. at 533–34. 
 235. Id. at 534–35. 
 236. United States v. Peugh, 675 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We, however, 
stand by [our prior precedent’s] reasoning—the advisory nature of the guidelines 
vitiates any ex post facto problem—and again decline the invitation to overrule 
it.”), rev’d, 569 U.S. 530 (2013). 
 237. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 539 (2013) (quoting Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 
(2000)). 
 238. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430–36 (1987). 
 239. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 793–94 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
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the central role that even the post-Booker, advisory 
Guidelines continue to play in federal sentencing.240 Based 
on this role, the Court reversed, concluding that “altering the 
substantive ‘formula’ used to calculate the applicable 
sentencing range” poses a “significant risk”241 of inflicting a 
greater punishment—even when the range is technically 
advisory only.242 
In reaching its holding in Peugh, the Court soundly 
rejected the notion that the Guidelines offer mere guidance, 
or “advice,” to the district court. Justice Sotomayor, writing 
for the majority, took particular issue with the Government 
analogizing the Guidelines to a policy paper: 
While the Government accurately describes several attributes of federal 
sentencing after Booker, the conclusion it draws by isolating these 
features of the system is ultimately not supportable. On the 
Government’s account, the Guidelines are just one among many 
persuasive sources a sentencing court can consult, no different from a 
“policy paper.” The Government’s argument fails to acknowledge, 
however, that district courts are not required to consult any policy paper 
in order to avoid reversible procedural error; nor must they “consider the 
extent of [their] deviation” from a given policy paper and “ensure that 
the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the 
variance.” Courts of appeals, in turn, are not permitted to presume that 
a sentence that comports with a particular policy paper is reasonable; 
nor do courts of appeals, in considering whether the district court’s 
sentence was reasonable, weigh the extent of any departure from a given 
policy paper in determining whether the district court abused its 
discretion. It is simply not the case that the Sentencing Guidelines are 
merely a volume that the district court reads with academic interest in 
the course of sentencing.243 
This passage reflects an appreciation for post-Booker 
precedent and sentencing practices that informs a holistic 
view of the Guidelines’ role in sentencing. But Peugh was a 
 
 240. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 541–42 (“The post-Booker federal sentencing 
scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are 
anchored by the Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark 
through the process of appellate review.”). 
 241. Id. at 550–51 (citations omitted). 
 242. See id. at 546–50. 
 243. Id. at 548–49 (citations omitted). 
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close decision and the dissenting Justices had a different 
perspective. 
In the Peugh dissent, Justice Thomas, Justice Roberts, 
Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito took a narrower, less-holistic 
view of the role of the Guidelines in federal sentencing.244 To 
the dissenting Justices, the answer was simple: the advisory 
nature of the post-Booker Guidelines renders the Guidelines 
impotent, in and of themselves, to “alter the punishment 
affixed” to an offender’s crime.245  This is so, for two reasons: 
(1) because the Guidelines “do not constrain the discretion of 
district courts,” they “have no legal effect on a defendant’s 
sentence;” and (2) even if the Guidelines do create a risk of a 
harsher punishment, “that risk results from the Guidelines’ 
persuasive force, not any legal effect.”246 The dissenting 
Justices subscribed to the Seventh Circuit’s characterization 
of Booker as transforming the Guidelines “from law to 
advice,” stating that, after Booker, the Guidelines “merely 
influence[] the exercise of the sentencing judge’s 
discretion.”247 The dissent concluded by treating Booker as a 
return to indeterminate sentencing: because the statutory 
sentencing range remained the same from the time of the 
offense to the time of sentencing, and because the advisory 
Guidelines sentencing range does not “affix” a punishment, 
Peugh’s sentencing under the newer Guidelines did not 
offend the Ex Post Facto Clause.248 
By comparison, Peugh’s majority and dissenting opinions 
fundamentally differ in their view of a district court’s 
discretion under the advisory Guidelines. The difference can 
be summed up in a single question: Is discretion a matter of 
degree or is it black-and-white? Put differently: Is the 
discretionary nature of the advisory Guidelines a return to 
 
 244. See id. at 551–57, 563 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 245. See id. at 551. 
 246. Id. at 551–52. 
 247. Id. at 552–55. 
 248. See id. 
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indeterminate sentencing? The answer to these questions 
appears to determine the outcome of all constitutionality 
questions with respect to the Guidelines. Just as with Peugh, 
this view determined the outcome in Beckles. But this time, 
the majority and minority views of the role of the Guidelines 
in post-Booker sentencing had reversed. 
In terms of counting noses, the radical change in the view 
of the Guidelines from Peugh to Beckles was due to two 
circumstances: Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer moved 
camps and joined the majority, and Justice Kagan did not 
participate in the consideration or decision in Beckles.249 This 
resulted in effectively a 5-2 split in Beckles over what role the 
Guidelines play in federal sentencing. This also resulted in a 
radically different answer to the question. Gone was the 
holistic view and weight of statistical data; in was a black 
and white view of judicial discretion. In this sense, which is 
fundamental, Peugh and Beckles are irreconcilable. 
Perhaps aware of this criticism, Justice Thomas, writing 
for the majority in Beckles, strained to comport Beckles with 
Peugh. He asserted that Peugh was still good law but narrow 
in its holding.250 He argued that vagueness in the Eighth 
Amendment context is different from vagueness under the 
Due Process Clause.251 Finally, he explained that the 
Guidelines are not “entirely immune” from scrutiny under 
the Due Process Clause.252 But it is difficult to see how the 
 
 249. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 889 (2017). 
 250. See id. at 894–96 (“Our holding today does not render the advisory 
Guidelines immune from constitutional scrutiny. . . . But the void-for-vagueness 
and ex post facto inquiries are ‘analytically distinct.’”) (citations omitted). 
 251. Id. Justice Thomas explained: 
The Court has also recognized ‘in the Eighth Amendment context’ that 
a district court’s reliance on a vague sentencing factor in a capital case, 
even indirectly, ‘can taint the sentence.’ But our approach to vagueness 
under the Due Process Clause is not interchangeable with ‘the rationale 
of our cases construing and applying the Eighth Amendment.’ 
Id. at 895–96. (citations omitted). 
 252. Id. at 896 (“Finally, our holding today also does not render ‘sentencing 
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past cases cited in Beckles could be decided the same given 
the Court’s evolved view of the role of the Guidelines. For 
example, Justice Thomas already stated in his dissent in 
Peugh that he believed Peugh was decided wrongly.253 
There’s no reason to see why any other cases dealing with 
constitutionality and the Guidelines, from Beckles forward, 
would elicit a different response. 
IV. ESCAPING ROOM 101: RECOMMENDATIONS TO MITIGATE 
THE HARMS CREATED BY BECKLES AND OTHER RELATED 
DECISIONS 
Circuit courts, inspired by Beckles, have begun to take 
constitutional questions surrounding federal sentencing law 
in previously unforeseeable directions. In United States v. 
Sanchez-Rojas, for example, the Eighth Circuit has held that 
when the Guidelines merely cross-reference an 
unconstitutional statute, the statute is no longer 
unconstitutional for Guidelines purposes.254 The Fifth 
Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. 
Godoy.255 The rationale for Sanchez-Rojas and Godoy lies 
beyond the holding of Beckles but is perhaps not inconsistent 
with Beckles’s underlying reasoning, specifically its view of 
the role of the Guidelines in federal sentencing. This is now 
the landscape that the courts have created, one in which the 
 
procedure[s]’ entirely ‘immune from scrutiny under the due process clause.’ We 
hold only that the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, including § 4B1.2(a)’s residual 
clause, are not subject to a challenge under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 253. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 560–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 254. United States v. Sanchez-Rojas, 889 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2018) 
(“Applying the Beckles/Johnson reasoning here, Sanchez-Rojas cannot maintain 
his vagueness challenge against U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). We see no meaningful 
difference between a Guidelines section that uses the same language as a statute 
(like § 4B1.2(a)(2)) and a section that incorporates the statutory language by 
reference (like § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)).”). 
 255. See United States v. Godoy, 890 F.3d 531, 537–38 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The 
Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges. So it does not necessarily 
follow from Dimaya that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in the Guidelines 
context.”). 
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decisions of the Sentencing Commission will be 
incrementally inoculated from constitutional concerns. To be 
sure, it only gets more Orwellian from here. But it does not 
have to be. In fact, there are concrete steps that those 
involved in criminal law—the Sentencing Commission, 
Congress, the courts, and the criminal bar—can take to begin 
to right the ship and mitigate some of the harms and 
injustices created by the Court in Beckles. 
A. The United States Sentencing Commission 
As explained above, the Sentencing Commission, as the 
promulgator of the Guidelines, plays an extraordinarily large 
role in federal sentencing. Larger, in fact, than a majority on 
the Supreme Court is currently willing to recognize. As a 
district court’s interpretation and application of the 
Guidelines has become more insulated from review 
(especially as it relates to constitutional concerns) than a 
court’s treatment of statutory authority, it is incumbent 
upon the Sentencing Commission to work diligently to avoid 
constitutional problems even in the absence of congressional 
or judicial direction. The Sentencing Commission should do 
so in three ways, each of which would serve to promote the 
Sentencing Commission’s policy objective of “just 
punishment” as well as to ameliorate its concerns over 
judicial economy.256 
First, the Sentencing Commission should remove any 
language from the Guidelines that is similar to (or the same 
as) statutory language struck as unconstitutional. Thus far, 
the Commission has been extremely effective and proactive 
in doing so. Most notably, in Amendment 798, the Sentencing 
Commission deleted the career offender residual clause “as a 
 
 256. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 . . . provides for the development of 
guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: 
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. The Act 
delegates broad authority to the Commission to review and rationalize the federal 
sentencing process.”) (emphasis added). 
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matter of policy,” citing Johnson and judicial economy.257 
This was the correct decision, on both grounds, and the 
Sentencing Commission should remain vigilant in 
identifying any future opportunities to make similar 
amendments as expeditiously as possible. 
Second, the Sentencing Commission should remove any 
cross-reference to a statute that has been held 
unconstitutional, or expressly excuse from the cross-
reference the unconstitutional portion. Because some 
circuits are using Beckles to hold that unconstitutional 
statutes remain in effect for Guidelines purposes when 
incorporated by cross-reference,258 it is solely up to the 
Sentencing Commission to decide whether problematic 
language remains. 
Third, the Sentencing Commission should expressly 
declare retroactive any amendments removing potentially 
unconstitutional language. By its own terms, Amendment 
798 only applied to offenders who were sentenced after 
August 1, 2016, foreclosing relief for many offenders on 
collateral review.259 While the retroactive application of the 
Guidelines is eventually a decision for the judiciary, one 
factor courts consider is whether the Sentencing Commission 
expressly intended the Amendment to apply retroactively.260 
 
 257. Id. app. C, Supp., amend. 798. The Guidelines Manual states: 
The Commission determined that the residual clause at § 4B1.2 
implicates many of the same concerns cited by the Supreme Court in 
Johnson, and, as a matter of policy, amends § 4B1.2(a)(2) to strike the 
clause. Removing the residual clause has the advantage of alleviating 
the considerable application difficulties associated with that clause, as 
expressed by judges, probation officers, and litigants. Furthermore, 
removing the clause will alleviate some of the ongoing litigation and 
uncertainty resulting from the Johnson decision. 
Id. 
 258. E.g., Godoy, 890 F.3d at 537–38; Sanchez-Rojas, 889 F.3d at 952. 
 259. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, Supp., amend. 798 (the 
Amendment became effective on August 1, 2016). 
 260. United States v. Huff, 370 F.3d 454, 465–67 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining 
that courts look to the Commission’s express statements on retroactivity but do 
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An affirmative statement of retroactivity, even if ultimately 
uneventful, would at least lend some credence to the 
arguments of a defendant whose offense level was increased 
as a result of constitutionally questionable language. 
B. Congress 
Baked into the concept of a mandatory minimum is a 
one-size-fits-all approach to sentencing. This can be a 
problem that is further intensified when Congress includes 
catch-all provisions, such as a residual clause, in mandatory 
minimum statutes. The solution to the problems posed by 
residual clauses specifically, and a one-size-fits-all approach 
generally, is to abandon such approaches altogether and 
allow district judges to make sentencing decisions—in 
consultation with the Guidelines—on a case by case basis. 
This was the case for much of the history of federal 
sentencing, before Congress began passing mandatory 
minimum recidivism statutes in the mid-1980s. And these 
statutes have created problems ever since, dramatically 
increasing our prison population and giving the courts 
enormous difficulties in weighing their application.261 This is 
part of the reason the Sentencing Commission has drifted 
away from residual clauses, and to an extent, prior-
conviction-enhancement provisions.262 In this respect, 
Congress should follow the Sentencing Commission’s lead. 
Short of abandoning mandatory minimum recidivism 
statutes altogether, Congress should take additional steps to 
inject clarity into its prior-conviction enhancement 
 
not treat them as binding). 
 261. See Matthew C. Lamb, Note, A Return to Rehabilitation: Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 41 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS. 
126, 132–34 (2015). 
 262. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, Supp., amend. 798 
(“Removing the residual clause has the advantage of alleviating the considerable 
application difficulties associated with that clause, as expressed by judges, 
probation officers, and litigants. Furthermore, removing the clause will alleviate 
some of the ongoing litigation and uncertainty resulting from the Johnson 
decision.”). 
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provisions in order to reduce unnecessary litigation. 
Congress should do so in three ways. First, it should include 
a definition for each enumerated offense, even if simply 
copied from courts’ generic definitions. Although the courts 
have done most of this work by now, a statutory definition 
would prevent new definitional questions from arising. 
Second, Congress should revise all “elements” clauses to 
clearly state the mens rea and degree of force required to 
satisfy the clause. This would settle many ongoing disputes 
among the circuits.263 And third, Congress should remove all 
residual clauses from the United States Code, whether 
courts have deemed them unconstitutional or not.264 While 
Congress would not ordinarily need to remove a residual 
clause once a court has declared it unconstitutional, some 
circuits are now actually using Congress’s inaction to infer 
an intent to revive an unconstitutional statute for some 
applications.265 
C. The Courts 
Although no federal judge would admit to a results 
oriented approach to sentencing law, many decisions betray 
this species of judicial activism. Such decisions can come in 
obvious forms, such as unusually narrow or counterintuitive 
interpretations of statutes, Guidelines, and binding 
 
 263. The circuits remain entrenched in extrapolating the full implications of 
two Supreme Court decisions. E.g., Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 
(2016) (dealing with the mens rea required under the same type of clause); 
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (dealing with the degree of physical 
force required to satisfy an “elements” clause). 
 264. The obvious current example is 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2018), which is 
nearly identical in wording to the residual clause the Court struck in Sessions v. 
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
 265. See, e.g., United States v. Godoy, 890 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(“Section 16(b) remains on the books, not purged from existence—at least for 
confined uses. And until Congress acts or we are presented with binding 
authority to the contrary, § 16(b) remains incorporated into the advisory-only 
Guidelines for definitional purposes.”). 
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precedent.266 They can also come in subtler forms, such as a 
systematic refusal to engage in substantive reasonableness 
review of terms of imprisonment.267 Three adaptations would 
improve the current system. First, judges must take a 
consistent, principled approach to sentencing law that is 
outcome blind. Second, judges must reconsider sentencing 
decisions not as administrative problems but as justice 
solutions. Third, courts must begin to engage in meaningful 
substantive reasonableness review. This third 
recommendation warrants some additional elaboration. 
As part of Booker’s remedial holding, the Supreme Court 
elevated reasonableness review, which may or may not have 
previously existed in any meaningful way,268 to a primary 
appellate concern about sentencing.269 At the time, the role 
that reasonableness review would actually play was in 
dispute. The remedial majority was optimistic, predicting 
that circuit courts would “prove capable” of “applying the 
standard.”270 The dissent, on the other hand, was alarmist, 
predicting that reasonableness review would “produce a 
discordant symphony” and “wreak havoc” on courts.271 Both 
were wrong: substantive reasonableness review entered with 
 
 266. See id. 
 267. See Note, More than a Formality: the Case for Meaningful Substantive 
Reasonableness Review, 127 HARV. L. REV. 951, 959–61 (2014) [hereinafter More 
than a Formality]. 
 268. The majority believed it did exist, United States v. Booker, 534 U.S. 220, 
262 (2005) (“‘Reasonableness’ standards are not foreign to sentencing law.”), 
while the dissent believed it did not exist, id. at 310 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[S]entences within the Guidelines range have not previously been reviewed for 
reasonableness. Indeed, the very concept . . . finds no support in statutory 
language or established practice of the last two decades.”). 
 269. Id. at 262–64 (majority opinion). 
 270. Id. (explaining that contrary to Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, 
“appellate judges will prove capable” of applying the reasonableness standard). 
 271. Id. at 312–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that “‘unreasonableness’ 
review will produce a discordant symphony of different standards, varying from 
court to court and judge to judge, giving the lie to the remedial majority’s 
sanguine claim that ‘no feature’ of its avant-garde Guidelines system will ‘ten[d] 
to hinder’ the avoidance of ‘excessive sentencing disparities’”) (citations omitted). 
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a whisper. In fact, it is rarely used in any meaningful 
sense.272 Several circuit judges, for example, have publicly 
stated that substantive reasonableness review “defies 
appellate explanation,” is unprincipled, a “waste of time,” 
and “has essentially become no appellate review.”273 But this 
does not have to be so. 
The Supreme Court can, in one or two cases, 
dramatically advance substantive reasonableness review. 
First, it should provide clear principles that appellate courts 
should consider when evaluating substantive 
reasonableness. Second, it should reverse Rita v. United 
States, in which the Court held that an appellate court may 
impose a presumption of reasonableness on within-
Guidelines sentences but may not impose a presumption of 
unreasonableness on sentences outside the advisory 
Guidelines range.274 This undercuts reasonableness review 
by failing to energize the principle that district courts should 
only vary outside the advisory Guidelines range when they 
have a good reason for doing so.275 Even after Booker, that 
principle is sound but lacks reinforcement. This would build 
on the three substantive reasonableness recommendations 
by the Sentencing Commission in its 2012 Booker Report to 
“[d]evelop more robust substantive appellate review”: (1) 
require a presumption of reasonableness for within-
Guidelines sentences; (2) require more justification for 
sentences outside the advisory Guidelines range; and (3) 
 
 272. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has only ever vacated one sentence on 
substantive reasonableness grounds, in United States v. Chandler, 732 F.3d 434 
(5th Cir. 2013). 
 273. See More than a Formality, supra note 267, at 959–60. 
 274. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 355–56 (2007) (“The fact that we 
permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean 
that courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness.”). 
 275. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (“It is also clear that a 
district judge must give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from 
the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an 
unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient 
justifications.”). 
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require heightened review of sentences that are based on 
policy disagreements with the Guidelines.276 
D. The Criminal Bar 
Nearly every case that reaches the United States 
Supreme Court—whether Peugh, Johnson, Welch, or 
Beckles—began with an objection before the district court. 
The case then proceeded with a well-reasoned and well-
argued appeal. Finally, an attorney introduced the case to 
the Supreme Court, likely in a terse but thoughtful petition 
for writ of certiorari. These are the ingredients for good 
lawyering and for moving the law in a beneficial direction. 
And while no single ingredient is sufficient, all are necessary. 
As the arc of the moral universe slowly bends, criminal 
attorneys (defense attorneys and prosecutors alike) can help 
point it toward justice. It is needed now as much as ever. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The story of Booker, Peugh, Johnson, and Beckles is 
multilayered. On the surface, it tells of the Supreme Court 
working both to identify the constitutional vulnerabilities of 
the Guidelines and to explore how the analysis changed 
when the Guidelines transitioned from mandatory to 
advisory. On a deeper level, however, it tells of two 
competing narratives about the impact of Booker and the 
present role of the advisory Guidelines. As the dissenting 
narrative overtook the majority narrative, most notably in 
Beckles, both the past and the present were, in a real way, 
rewritten. As a result, similarly situated defendants suffered 
divergent outcomes. And it does not end there. Now, in light 
of the new narrative, circuit courts are blazing more puzzling 
trails, eroding the ideals of consistency, uniformity, and, at 
the end of the day, fairness. But there is hope: the Sentencing 
Commission, Congress, the courts, and the criminal bar can 
 
 276. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED 
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 111–12 (2012). 
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respond to guide federal sentencing practice back toward a 
more principled place where things are what they seem. This 
is a worthwhile pursuit that is necessary to restore a 
semblance of justice to the often vexing world of federal 
sentencing law. 
